University of Virginia Library

CHAPTER 5
At War with the Angels: The United People Campaign

It is not our aim to derive conclusions concerning the effectiveness of the Congregation or their impact on the community. Rather, our principal objective is to examine the style of social action pursued by the Congregation and to consider the reactions of various sectors of the community to this style. In this manner we hope to provide church leaders with some additional basis for measuring the viability of the life-style of the Congregation for Reconciliation as a model for other communities.

The Congregation for Reconciliation has been involved in at least forty-one different social-action projects. [1] These range from one-time protests to a campaign sustained since early in the life of the group. Some projects have involved only two or three members and others have included nearly the entire active membership of the Congregation. [2]

The initial projects created media visibility for the mission but had limited possibilities for generating a major victory. The Christmas card leafleting of National Cash Register employees gained public attention but produced no measurable results. The issue, in fact, belonged to the Second Family, a group of black NCR employees; the Congregation only supplied support. Their second project attempted to deal with prison reform. On Good Friday in 1969, several members of the Congregation participated in a pilgrimage in Columbus from the capitol building to the state penitentiary, with cross in tow, simulating the procession of Christ from Pilate's court to Golgotha. At each "station of the cross," press releases were distributed condemning different aspects of

the prevailing system for dispensing criminal justice. The symbolism is biting. At the County Courthouse, Christ is condemned; at the Board of Elections, Christ falls. At the State Office Building, Christ falls again, and again at the Federal Office Building. At the Ohio Council of Churches offices, a woman wipes Christ's face, and finally he is crucified at the Ohio Penitentiary. The march was well staged and received extensive coverage by the media. But here again, the Congregation provided support personnel for a project not entirely their own.

By the spring of 1969, Righter recognized the Congregation's need for a long-term project of some magnitude to provide stability and continuity for congregational action outreach and, more importantly, to inspire the hope of a significant victory. Righter had more than his instincts to point him toward the United Fund as a serious subject of direct action.

Footnotes

Physician Heal Thyself:
The United Fund Comes Under Attack

During the 1960s, United Fund and Community Chest organizations across the nation faced increasing criticism. Most of the objections pivoted around the need to reevaluate the allocation of charity funds collected by these groups. There was a growing feeling, in many cases supported by evidence, that funds were being disproportionately allocated to organizations with predominantly middle-class clients. Most visible, for example, were groups such as Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and Camp Fire Girls.

The rising awareness of poverty in the country left the United Fund organizations vulnerable. While much of this criticism came from the outside, many within the organizations also desired change and openly denounced some United Fund operations. United Fund boards, however, were generally not representative of the interests of minorities or the poor and hence were seldom receptive to the proposals for change. Rather, their self-perpetuating memberships, selected from the ranks of community corporate structures and the boards of recipient agencies, huddled to protect their own interests.

At the national level, though, pressures did mount for reform from within. At the 1968 annual meeting of the United Commu

nity Fund and Council of America (UCFCA), it was proposed that "United Fund dollars be used principally to make services available to those who cannot pay for them and to enable agencies to use fee systems which make possible the extension of services to the largest possible numbers." [3] An even more aggressive role was advocated by William Aramony, executive vice-president of the United Way of America:

In response to these growing expressions of discontent, the UCFCA in 1968 appointed a task force to study community fund organizations and to make recommendations for new priorities. In February 1970 they announced the adoption of a new set of priorities resulting from the task force study. These priorities included the following:

• To support new and innovative services aimed at helping families and individuals break out of the poverty cycle and achieve fuller lives.
• To extend services to blighted areas in cooperation with the residents of such areas.
• To strengthen or develop approaches aimed at reducing crime, delinquency, drug addiction, alcoholism and other manifestations of antisocial behavior.
• To maintain services that build character and self-reliance, promote physical and mental health and preserve individual dignity and family solidarity.
• To enable established agencies to achieve more nearly their full service potential by narrowing the gap between their validated need and present contribution level.
• To increase the participation of citizens in planning and overseeing both voluntary and government social welfare programs.

---

97



• To make more funds available by shifting money from outdated or low priority programs, charging more fees to those able to pay for services and raising annual contributions to one billion just as soon as possible. [5]

Footnotes

The United People Campaign

When the Social Action Committee of the Congregation was formally established in March of 1969, a subcommittee formed to consider the United Fund in the city. Research had already begun on the distribution of United Fund services and on the backgrounds of United Fund board members. By May of that year the subcommittee concluded that some within the local organization were committed to such goals as those cited above, and thus the possibility for change was real. In September, one of the two major local newspapers expressed interest in the study of the subcommittee and, in early December, gave the report front-page coverage. The criticisms of the United Fund, now documented, became a public issue.

The United People organization emerged the following summer. A coalition of seven groups organized earlier that year had by then dissolved because of disagreement over boycott strategies. United People actually included the Congregation and the Social Welfare Workers Movement, but press coverage identified the Congregation for Reconciliation as the prime mover and the Rev. Richard Righter as its spokesman. In formulating goals for United People, all had agreed that a shift in OF priorities in response to protest, without an accompanying shift in leadership, would be a pyrrhic victory. The 1968 UCFCA task force had called for the local United Fund organizations to increase the participation of citizens in planning and overseeing programs. The United People expanded the charge somewhat by insisting that the decision making of the United Fund be open to public surveillance, that the composition of its Board of Directors reflect the backgrounds and interests of a broader spectrum of the citizens of the community, and that member agencies (which received OF monies) not be allowed on the organization's governing board. The United People opted for the long-term strategy of pushing for the creation of countervailing power within the organization

rather than only for the alternative of short-term organizational outcomes. They assumed the latter would follow the former and agreed not to be bought off by a temporary shift in funding priorities.

Threatening its fund-raising goal by attracting attention to inconsistencies between the ideals of volunteers and community service and the fund-raising and funding practices of the organization seemed the surest way to attract the attention of the United Fund organizers. Although a direct menace to the vital fund-raising function of UP seemed to promise real leverage for bargaining, this strategy involved some serious risks. In the first place, the United Fund had over the years cultivated a large reservoir of goodwill in the community. It was seen by most people as a good organization, unselfishly tending to many human needs, providing community services through the voluntary sacrifices of many citizens. For most, to attack the United Fund would be tantamount to attacking goodness and mercy. To threaten the life of the United Fund through a boycott would likewise be an unfair and cruel act, jeopardizing community services to many persons. Who can win a war with the angels? The United Fund would be defended by some for whom it otherwise would have had a low saliency.

The risk, however, was taken. In the fall of 1970, coincident with the campaign of United Appeal, the fund-raising arm of the United Fund, United People distributed 35,000 leaflets to employees of several major corporations in the city. The leaflets called attention to the composition of United Fund leadership, to the under representation of the poor among service recipients, and to several community needs not addressed by the Fund. Arguing that pleas for change through regular channels had been fruitless, the leaflet asked that contributions be withheld from the United Appeal. The United People received immediate television and newspaper coverage. The United Fund responded by inviting their spokesperson to address its executive staff, showing a willingness to hear criticisms and react responsibly to protest. At this encounter the UP spokesman addressed the Board with praise for their dedication to community service, saying the complaint was not with the good the United Fund was doing but with the good it was not doing. The indirectness of this approach made it

difficult for the United Fund to attack credibly the motives of United People.

The counter strategy was threefold. First, while building the image of the United People as well-meaning but misguided wreckers of society, the OF organizers simultaneously presented themselves as reasonable in the face of opposition. They further took advantage of the conflict situation to motivate their volunteers to greater efforts, thus using the opposition of the United People to help achieve the Appeal's campaign goal. A letter sent on October 2, 1970, to "All Campaign Volunteers" makes this counter strategy plain:

In an attempt to counter the initial leafleting at the gates of local industrial plants, the AFL-CIO Council distributed 10,000 rebuttal flyers to the employees. By mid-October the controversy had escalated into a major social issue in the community.

Calling upon the fairness doctrine of the Federal Communications Commission, the United People pressed the local television stations to give them equal time to state their case opposite TV ads for the United Appeal. [6] Upon receipt of evidence of controversy, the FCC ruled favorably upon the request. Citing cases of alleged coercion by campaign volunteers to solicit pledges from factory workers, the United People attacked the claim of

volunteers on which the Appeal rested much of its asserted legitimation. Over fifty calls came from citizens giving examples of arm-twisting in the campaign. These examples were fed back into the media to broaden the attack.

When the United Appeal campaign ended, pledges totaled $5,601,208, more than $250,000 short of the campaign goal. This marked the first time its goal had not been achieved since the late 1950s. The final act of the 1970 drama came in the public dispute over the symbolic victory of the United People. The United Fund officials publicly denied that the United People boycott accounted in any way for their failure to achieve the predetermined goal. Rather, they pointed to higher unemployment, lower corporate profits, strikes, and inflation as explanations. However, the United People were given implicit credit in press accounts for a symbolic and psychological victory.

Privately, United Fund officials admitted having no reliable appraisal of the impact United People had had on their fund-raising drive. Some suggested that the increased sense of urgency and dedication in many campaign workers may have more than compensated for any loss of funds from those persuaded by the boycott campaign. Having won the psychological victory, however, United People could, at the last curtain call, admit in the press to also not knowing if the boycott had actually affected the United Appeal. After all, 95.6 percent of the goal had been achieved.

During the following year the United Fund made some minor shifts in priorities and installed a few new faces in the leadership circle, but when the 1971 United Appeal campaign was kicked off at a downtown rally, United People members were there leafleting the crowd. As a football was kicked down the street signifying the campaign kickoff, one conspicuous member of United People appeared wearing a sandwich-board sign reading, "The United Appeal Is Carrying the Ball the Wrong Direction."

The 1971 United People boycott campaign basically reran the strategy of the previous year. They did, however, place greater emphasis upon the inconsistency between the national statements of the United Fund organization quoted earlier and the practices of the local organization. United Appeal fell short in its campaign for a second year, despite a decrease in the goal's amount by

$163,000, itself a symbolic victory for United People. Pledges fell $119,000, or 5.1 percent, short of the lowered goal. Again, the United People tallied a victory.

Next, a new executive officer of the United Fund came aboard. Priority changes were more drastic than before. Privately, the president of the United Fund contacted United People in June 1972, after the demands of United People had been discussed in a meeting of the Board of Directors, and informed them:

1. (1) This year, the Budget Committee [has] adopted a policy that no person serving as a board member of a member agency shall participate on the Budget Committee Panel determining allocations for that agency.
2. (2) The policy of publicizing the community activities of the candidates proposed for the Board of Directors by the Nominating Committee will be continued.
3. (3) The United Fund bylaws were changed at the 1972 annual meeting to provide for election of three-fourths of the annual Board of Directors vacancies at the annual meeting. Should nominations from the floor be offered, the chairman of the meeting would decide appropriate action.
4. (4) The functional budgeting program was developed to facilitate the service funding concept from agencies to communities, to families and individuals unable to pay for the services. . . .
5. (5) The United Appeal will publicize that donations will be confidentially refunded on presented evidence that the donor had to give because of threat against promotion or threatened job loss. The appropriate 1973 campaign literature will carry this message.

The statement concluded with the hope that members of United People could now "position" themselves as members of the United Fund who could make their own pledges and encourage others to do so.

On paper, United People had achieved most of its objectives. In response to the pledge of the United Fund to meet its demands, the 1972 boycott was called off. The Appeal met its 1972 goal.

United People then tested two of the promises made by the Board of Directors of the United Fund to establish their good faith. Leaflets were distributed to employees of several industrial

Plants, repeating the United Fund's promise to make refunds upon request. The leaflet included a coupon which could be sent directly to the executive officer of the United Fund requesting the refund of a 1972 pledge. The executive was forced to admit to newsmen that it was more difficult to grant refunds than had been indicated in the United People leaflet. The request must come in the form of a letter documenting perceived threats to one's employment or other forms of coercion connected with the pledge. The United Fund publicly lost face over this issue.

In a countermove, the United Fund held open hearings as part of its annual budget meeting. This move won high praise from United Fund critics, including United People. Despite poor attendance at the six-day meetings, the executive director, in press conference, called opening the session worthwhile "because of what it represents." It was, in a sense, another pledge of good faith.

In the spring of 1973, members of United People made contributions to the United Fund and attended its annual meeting. They came with a slate of officers to nominate from the floor, including ministers, social workers, and others interested in the goals of United People. The statement received from the president of United Fund had indicated that "the chairman of the meeting would decide appropriate action" when nominations were made from the floor. The appropriate action, as it turned out, was to state that the constitution of the United Fund denied the possibility of such nominations. The United People members left before the vote and proceeded directly to the courts with a suit demanding the election be voided and that newly elected directors be prohibited from taking any action until the suit was settled. A real change in the locus of power within the organization had been narrowly averted by the United Fund administrators, but in so doing they had opened the possibility of being paralyzed by court order. A hearing was held in June of 1973 but the judge's decision was postponed; he preferred informally to seek a mutually acceptable solution. The United Fund board wasted no time in establishing a committee to study their election procedures. In July it recommended and the board accepted a procedure whereby nominations would be allowed from the community by petitions of 100 names each, to be presented not

less than twenty-one days prior to the 1974 annual meeting. The United People, feeling that their faith in the promises of United Fund leaders had once been misplaced, agreed to the new election procedures but planned a boycott of the 1973 United Appeal campaign to keep the pressure on. If the new election procedures result in a redistribution of power on the governing board of the United Fund in the summer of 1974, United People will have achieved its long-term objectives. At that point it is likely that United People will become a low-profile watchdog organization and will fade from the front pages of the local newspapers.

Footnotes

United People Strategy Reconsidered

The boycott approach taken by United People was a long-term, high-risk strategy. As the drama unfolded, the strategy seemed to have accomplished its goals, or nearly so. Not without costs, however.

Could the same goals have been accomplished over a four-year period by working behind the scenes? The United Fund leadership asserts that most of the changes made had been planned before United People entered the scene. Our efforts, from a distance, to assess social-action projects lead us to believe that UP at least succeeded in speeding the change process. Had they chosen other than the boycott strategy, their demands may not have weighed so seriously, nor the United Fund have taken the initiative itself. One corporation executive privately warned the protest group that "many persons are looking for an excuse not to give to United Appeal and you just may be supplying them with that excuse." Clearly, the boycott, although a high-risk strategy, accurately focused on the most vulnerable flank of the organization. All else depends on fund-raising. In establishing a direct (although farfetched) threat to the organization's existence, they guaranteed a hearing for their demands.

Conflict effects and is affected by four variables. They are: relative power, interaction, sentiment, and attrition. [7] Let's take a look at what happened in the United People campaigns in terms of these variables. Interaction between the two groups had occurred continuously, behind the scenes, moving straight toward

the approach of a truce. The open hearings of the OF Budget Committee were not only a pledge of good faith but also a significant step toward reduction of insulation from the protest group.

The United Fund, in attempting to utilize the presence of opposition to stimulate greater dedication on the part of campaign volunteers in 1970, had encouraged, within its own ranks, hostile sentiments toward United People. The United People organization, on the other hand, had attempted to keep personalities out of the conflict and had made every effort to praise the good intentions and dedication of the leaders and volunteer workers of United Fund and United Appeal. In so doing they may have neutralized, to some extent, the bitterness which could have prolonged the conflict and hindered the eventual settlement of differences.

Attrition in the conflict was calculable and highly symbolic. Because funding campaigns must set goals, United People could conceivably score successive victories. Because the dollar figure was so visible, the victory appeared as "all or nothing," although the differential was less than 6 percent both in 1970 and 1971. The success of United Appeal in reaching its campaign goal in 1972, in the absence of a boycott, actually served to reinforce the salience of the earlier United People victories. The United People had a strategic advantage with regard to attrition because its only goal was the prevention of its opponent's goal. Had the United Appeal swung the mallet and rung the bell each year, the attrition of the United People would have been visible, but far less so.

The United People may have made some strategic errors in initial calculations of the power of their opponent. This, perhaps, prolonged the conflict. They seem to have underestimated the reservoir of goodwill the United Fund had nurtured and compounded over the years. United People had chosen a formidable opponent. The lifeblood of fund raising is public relations, and in a fight for credibility the United People were dealing with seasoned thespians of the public theater.

Another significant underestimation was the extent of public resistance to the boycott strategy. The city has long seen itself as a quiet place, benevolently overseen by the corporate elite. Some describe the historic role of National Cash Register as not unlike

that of Eastman Kodak in Rochester, New York. We are uncertain just how far one could draw this parallel, but, not unlike Rochester, the city has a history pretty much void of controversial issues-with the exception of racial disturbances in the mid-sixties. And, not unlike Rochester also, the community rose in righteous indignation against those who brought controversy.

In the eyes of the public, the United People, Righter, and the Congregation for Reconciliation were closely aligned. This created two crosscurrents. On the one hand, it provided an air of legitimacy otherwise absent from the United People. As the 1971 campaign chairman for United Appeal said in a news interview, "You know, it's not becoming to a man who's a member of the clergy to go around using those sorts of tactics. I've always felt the United Appeal had a very strong religious flavor, and should have, because it's a humanitarian effort and service. I wish he'd help us." Obviously, the religious symbols embodied in United People created a degree of cognitive dissonance in the United Appeal, since this openly challenged their implicit claim to have God on their side.

On the other hand, the involvement of the Congregation for Reconciliation in a venture potentially undermining of a good liberal cause stirred dissonance among church people. As a result, local clergy, especially Presbyterians, experienced a great deal of pressure from their laity. This was particularly so in the larger and wealthier congregations where corporation support for United Appeal was reflected among active lay leaders. The largest Presbyterian church in the city, in its newsletter circulated to a membership of over three thousand, warned:

While many clergy recalled threats of withdrawal of money and/or membership from their congregations in protest of the activities of the Congregation for Reconciliation, only a few reported directly traceable loss of members or withholding of benevolence to Righter and his congregation. This should not, however, negate or underplay the sense of pressure felt by many clergy during the United People campaigns.

We should note here the discrepancy between the stress felt by Presbyterian and United Church of Christ clergy. The early publicity about the Congregation had indicated its affiliation with the Presbyterians. Several UCC pastors have stated they did not believe their laity were generally aware the Congregation for Reconciliation was also affiliated with the United Church of Christ.

Typically, community leaders and clergy believed it appropriate and important to call attention to the need for reform in the United Fund. But only three or four people we talked with endorsed a boycott initiated by a church group as an appropriate strategy to accomplish this. Several additional clergy indicated that their immediate personal reaction to the boycott was favorable but that their views changed as they began to feel the repercussions from laity. In 1971 a group of seventeen clergy released a statement calling for reform in the United Fund but explicitly rejecting Righter's methods. They expressed confidence in the possibility of achieving reform from within the organization. Certainly, as strategy, this move was welcomed by the United Fund to restore balance to the "God is on our side" dimension of the symbolic battle for credibility.

Footnotes

Summary

In sum, the prolonged struggle between the Congregation for Reconciliation and the United Fund influenced both organizations. It was the Congregation's first major social-action project, encountering a formidable opponent in a credibility drama which has lasted most of the mission's life. The United People campaign provided needed stability and continuity in social action. It also offered the potential for a visible major victory which would generate recognition and influence for the Congregation in

Dayton. In this sense, the United People, more than any other single action project, gained for the Congregation a public image. The image further reinforced the self-view of the Congregation as a local leader in the area of direct social action.

We feel it appropriate to introduce here a personal observation based on a good many years of analyzing public response to social issues. While we have no hard data to verify the validity of this observation in Dayton, we have every reason to believe Dayton to be no different from other communities from which we have gathered information. We are inclined to accept the sincerity of clergy and community leaders who favor reform of the United Fund but object to United People's tactics. On the other hand, it is a mistake to assume that the average citizen favors reform but simply objects to tactics. Average citizens, in all probability, have no quarrel at all with United Fund. They give to United Appeal not because some of their money goes to aid the poor but in spite of this. They give their money because they know it is used to support Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Red Cross, and the Y's. These are organizations from which they have benefitted, and they view the United Fund as a sensible way to support these programs. Similarly, most persons have experienced mental illness in their extended families, and the feeling that some of their money is going for treatment is desirable. In addition, probably a subtle psychological feeling of "goodness" or pietism creeps in simply from giving. But it also seems safe to assume the large majority of the population could not name many United Fund agencies in addition to the ones we have mentioned.

Probably the most effective way to reduce giving to the United Fund in any community would be to publicize those expenditures channeled to help the poor help themselves. Monies for legal aid and community organizations have had a terribly difficult time surviving the hatchets of conservative congressmen. [8] Widespread publicity of the use of the United Fund money for such activities would probably arouse the same responses and would seriously affect giving.

The United People campaign assumed that upper and middle income people, realizing they were giving not to the poor but to those who could afford to pay, would boycott the United Fund and/or demand reform. We believe this to be a misjudgment on

the part of United People. If the issues involved in the boycott were an important component in determining public opinion or the final objective of achieving reform, we believe this would have been a serious mistake in strategy. As our theoretical framework would suggest, however, concrete issues of how the money is spent were not very important in the public drama. Nor was it important that public opinion be sympathetic with the boycott. Indeed, had they succeeded in rallying any serious support for the boycott-that is, had a significant proportion of givers actually withheld their funds-they would have succeeded in sabotaging, not reforming, the United Fund. We are unaware of anyone associated with United People who viewed this as a desirable outcome of the boycott.

The success of United People was in gaining support for the principle of reform in United Fund procedures, an objective many community leaders shared. Indeed, one of the daily newspapers had editorialized for reform several years before United People was conceived. The public specter of a boycott dramatized the need for reform and in the process everyone favoring change, including persons within the United Fund organization, gained a little leverage. United People thus helped grease the wheels of change. And that, after all, was their objective.

Footnotes